Crisis of Petro-Perú: dilemma between liquidation and urgent fiscal restructuring.

The situation of Petro-Perú has turned into a pressing dilemma that not only affects the state-owned company but also jeopardizes the fiscal stability of the country. With accumulated debt exceeding 8 billion dollars, the government faces two alternatives that seem equally discouraging. One option would be to liquidate the company, which would involve assuming this debt and, consequently, a significant financial cost for the state. The other alternative, more sui generis, consists of capitalizing this debt and extending credit lines amounting to 3 billion dollars, but always under the condition that a radical restructuring takes place. However, this second option is not without risks. Maintaining Petro-Perú in its current form, despite the capital injection, could perpetuate the burden this company represents for the public treasury. The solution might lie in a deep restructuring that allows for attracting private investment, reaching up to 51% of the shareholding, similar to what has been achieved with other state-owned companies in Latin America. Only in this way could this entity be transformed into a true contribution to national development, rather than a bottomless pit consuming public resources. Despite the logic supporting such a solution, there are voices that vehemently oppose any measure involving the sale or partial privatization of Petro-Perú. Figures such as former minister Óscar Vera and the former president of the company, Pedro Chira, have recently been summoned by the president to discuss possible alternatives. Nevertheless, the question arises: why should Peruvians bear the burden of financing a financial disaster that is not the result of responsible public management, but of ideological decisions and particular privileges? The magnitude of the financing needed to rescue Petro-Perú starkly contrasts with other priorities of the state. For example, the 1.8 billion soles required to establish flagrancy units throughout the country could drastically reduce impunity and insecurity, issues that affect thousands of Peruvians daily. Investing in security and the well-being of the population should be an obligation of the state, rather than allocating resources to save a struggling company. The very existence of Petro-Perú calls into question the principles established in the 1993 Constitution, which states that the state should only intervene in sectors where the private sector has no interest. As a state-owned company, Petro-Perú lacks the necessary incentives to operate efficiently and profitably, becoming a political spoils that, instead of generating resources, consumes them. The reality is that state administration and subnational governments often find themselves trapped in patrimonialist practices that undermine public trust. With 24 billion soles reported annually as losses due to corruption, the situation becomes unsustainable. In this context, the controls that should serve to protect public resources often end up inhibiting the honest, while favoring the actions of those who stray from the path of ethics. The solution to this entanglement is not straightforward, but it is clear that radical changes in the management of public services are required. Proposals from Fernando Cillóniz and Carlos Basombrío suggest the creation of autonomous and highly professional bodies to manage public procurement and works. Only with a reform of such magnitude could the lost resources be recovered and ensure more efficient management. Meanwhile, the government's wait to make a decision about the future of Petro-Perú turns into an exercise of uncertainty. Peruvians deserve clear and effective answers, as well as a plan that does not place the burden of mismanagement on them. In the current context, the challenge is monumental, but it is not impossible if action is taken with determination and responsibilities are assumed by each involved actor. Time is running out, and the need for a decision becomes increasingly urgent.